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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction over the matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), and transferred it pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4). Jurisdiction in this Court is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) by transfer
from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE #1:

Fennell failed to comply with Rule 4-501 (2)(B) of the Utah

Code of Judicial Administration in opposing Green's Motion for Summary Judgment and
therefore Green's Statement of Undisputed Facts are deemed admitted and Green is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (R. 1608-09; 1705 at p. 92.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE #1: A trial court's interpretation of
a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial Administration presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness. See Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175, ^ 5, 982 P.2d 586.
ISSUE #2:

Fennell failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that

would preclude Green's summary judgment motion, and Green was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. (R. 1608-11.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE #2: "We review a trial court's
grant of summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law.
. . . We review the facts of this case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."
Premier Van Schaack Realty. Inc.. v. Sieg. 2002 Ut App 173, If 7, 448 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
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DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 4-501(2)(B), Utah Code of Judicial Administration for 2001 (copy
attached in full at Addendum 1):
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine
issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable,
shall state the numbered sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
Also, Rule 4-501(2)(B) for 2002 (copy attached in full at Addendum 2).
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
Fennell believes that the value of his residential property has been diminished
as a result of an adjacent landslide. (R. 2-11.) Fennell believes Green is liable for such
economic loss because Green was the developer of the lot which co-defendant Ivory
North bought, and on which Ivory North built Fennell's home. (R. 2-11.) Fennell sued
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Green for (1) negligent failure to disclose; (2) intentional failure to disclose; and (3)
breach of implied warranty. (R. 2-11.)
B. Course of the Proceedings,
Fennell filed his Complaint on or about April 7, 2000. (R. 2.) On June 18,
2001, Green filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of the claims asserted against
him by Fennell. (R. 506-08.) After discovery was complete, the trial court held oral
arguments on Green's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1608.) The argument took
place October 25, 2001. (R. 1607.)
C. Disposition in the Court Below.
The trial court granted Green's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed
all of Fennell's claims with prejudice. (R. 1607-11.) The basis for summary judgment,
among others, was that there were no disputed issues of material fact, no legal theory
under which Fennell could recover, and Fennell failed to comply with Rule 4-501 of the
Code of Judicial Administration. (R. 1607-11) (Order attached as Addendum 3, Oral
Ruling Addendum 4). The trial court also dismissed all of Fennell's claims against codefendants who had also filed motions for summary judgment. (R. 1607-11, 1650-54.)
D. Statement of Facts.
Plaintiff Fennell owns a residence on "Lot 31" 1 of the Falcon Ridge

1

Originally Lot 31 was denominated Lot 21 but was later changed in its
numbering to Lot 31.
3

Subdivision. (R. 3.) Green and Neil Wall were developers of the Falcon Ridge
Subdivision in Layton, Utah, and initially held title to Lot 31. (R. 3.) Ivory North, a codefendant, is a professional real estate developer and home builder. (R. 3.)
Green and Wall sold Lot 31 to Ivory North on July 7, 1995, and the deed was
recorded July 12, 1995. (R. 4-5.) Ivory North built a home on Lot 31 and on December
22, 1995, conveyed title to Fennell by deed pursuant to a purchase contract. (R. 4-5.)
Fennell had walked the property prior to purchasing it. (R. 10.)
During the development phase of Lot 31, Layton City required a soils report to
be done on the subdivision. (R. 526.) Glenn R. Maughan was hired to perform and did
perfomi the requested soils report. (R. 4, 526.) The Maughan report was published in the
public record. (R. 526.)
Maughan believed that the area of the hill on the north side of Lot 31 was not
a landslide. This was established by Maughan's report (R. 830-48), Maughan's
deposition testimony (R. 817-19), and Exhibit 4 of the deposition of Neil J. Wall (R. 846).
Following Maughan's conclusions and studies, Green and Wall followed the necessary
procedures in obtaining Layton City approval for the subdivision. (R. 526.) The City
Engineer and Layton City approved the subdivision for residential building. (R. 526.)
On April 14, 1998, Fennell experienced some movement of earth on the
backside (northwest side) of his property, Lot 31. (R. 5, 510.) No one was physically
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injured as a result of the movement of earth, nor was any other property belonging to
Fennell damaged or destroyed because of the movement of the earth. (R. 510.)
Fennell has never spoken to Green. (R. 510.) Fennell has never entered into
any agreement or contract with Green. (R. 510.) Fennell has never received any written
communication from Green. (R. 510.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Fennell failed to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. He has not cited to the record, as required by Rule 24(e). That failure has
disadvantaged Green, and the judgment below should be affirmed.
Consistent with his failure to follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Fennell
also failed to comply with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration at the
trial court. Green's statement of facts were deemed admitted because Fennell did not
dispute any of Green's facts. (R. 1705, at p. 92.) Summary judgment was proper on that
basis alone.
Further, Fennell's negligent failure to disclose claim fails as a matter of law.
First, as mentioned, he has failed to comply with Rule 4-501. Second, Fennell presented
no evidence that Green owed a duty of communication to Fennell, no evidence that Green
knew of a landslide potential on Lot 31, and no evidence that Green failed to make any
required disclosures. Third, Fennell's negligent failure to disclose claim is based on an
"inherent defect" in the real estate (Fennell's Appellate Brief, p. 5), representing
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economic loss which is barred by the Economic Loss Doctrine.
With regard to FennelFs intentional failure to disclose claim, there is no such
cause of action in Utah. Fraudulent non-disclosure is recognized; however, Fennell did
not plead the elements of fraud. Even if he had, the claim was properly dismissed for
failure to comply with Rule 4-501. Furthermore, as with the negligent failure to disclose
claim, Green was under no legal duty to disclose anything to Fennell. Even if Green did
owe Fennell a duty, Fennell did not present any facts or evidence indicating that Green
knew of a landslide potential on Lot 31, or that Green breached any duty of disclosure.
With regard to Fennell's breach of implied warranty claim, it appears that
Fennell waived that claim during oral arguments. However, even if he had not waived
the argument, Utah does not recognize an implied warranty on residential property.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I. FENNELL FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24 OF
THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND
THIS COURT SHOULD THEREFORE AFFIRM THE
JUDGMENT BELOW.
Fennell has not complied with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which requires "[References shall be made to the pages of the original record
as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b)." He has failed to make references to the record in
writing his appellate brief. Therefore, it is impossible to determine what record authority
he has for his statements and his appeal should be dismissed where Green is put in a
position of disadvantage in his response. See Uckerman v. Lincoln Nafl Life Ins. Co..
588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ("This Court need not, and will not consider any facts not
6

properly cited to, or supported by, the record.'5); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d
1182 (Utah App. 1987) ("If a party fails to make a concise statement of the facts and
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported, the court will assume
the correctness of the judgment below.").
If the Court believes this failure should be overlooked, Green makes the
following arguments.
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
GREEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED
ON FENNELL'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW RULE 4-501 OF
THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
Rule 4-501(2)(B) required Fennell, in opposing Green's Motion for Summary
Judgment, to set forth specifically:
[A] concise statement of material facts as to which the party
contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those
portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the
movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate
reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement.
When Fennell responded to Green's Motion for Summary Judgment, he did not comply
with this rule. Rather, Fennell completely ignored Green's facts and did not dispute them
as required by Rule 4-501(2)(B), and instead, set forth his own "Statement of Undisputed
Facts." (R. 597-605.) As a result, both Green and the trial court were left guessing as to
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which facts Fennell was disputing. (R. 815.) Fennell agreed during oral arguments that
he may have been "deficient" in complying with the rule, (R. 1705 at 42), but on appeal,
it is apparently Fennell's view that u[i]n dealing with a Motion for Summary Judgment,
the adverse party is entitled to have the Court survey the evidence . . . ." (Fennell's
Appellate Brief, p. 21.) However, as noted by the trial court, Rule 4-501 was adopted so
that parties, not the court, bear the burden of surveying the evidence:
I do not believe that the sheer size of a file when you lift it and heft
it means, gee, there must be an issue of dispute - disputed fact in
there somewhere. I think it's up to the parties to bring up those
issues and make it clear to the judge.
(R. 1705, at 92.) Therefore, the trial court correctly followed the mandatory language of
the rule that "[a]ll material facts . . . shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement."
Rule 4-501(2)(B), CJA.
Fennell also argues in his Appellate Brief that the trial court applied the wrong
version of Rule 4-501. The summary judgment arguments and ruling took place in
October 2001, and Fennell complains that the trial judge applied what is now the 2002
version of Rule 4-501. However, if one reads the transcript of the summary judgment
hearing on page 42, one would see that the trial judge quotes word for word the version of
Rule 4-501 on which he relies. (R. 1705, at 42.) The quotation of the trial judge is not
out of the 2002 version, but rather, is out of the version of Rule 4-501 that was in effect in
October 2001. (See Addenda 1&2.) In any event, both versions require the non-moving
8

party to dispute the moving party's facts, which Fennell did not do. (See Addenda 1 & 2).
Fennell complains that admitting Green's statement of facts under the
mandatory language of Rule 4-501 would improperly deprive Fennell of substantive
rights. Rule 4-501 states "[a]ll material facts . . . shall be deemed admitted." (Emphasis
added.) However, rather than a deprivation of substantive rights, as Fennell argues, the
enforcement of mandatory Rules of Judicial Administration is a well established means of
maintaining order and efficiency in the courts. See, e.g., Loporto, 1999 UT App 175,
^13, 982 P.2d 586, (trial court erred by ignoring mandatory procedure set out in Rule 4506, which requires trial court to await a failure to appear or appoint before entering
judgment); Price v. B. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) (trial court committed
"clear violation" of Rule 4-501 when it ruled before holding oral arguments); Parker v.
Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 497 n. 3 (Utah 1998) (trial court granted summary judgment, and
Supreme Court noted that the "memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to
Dodgion's motion set forth no disputed facts . . . [t]hat response did not conform to rule
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration"); Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, % 10,
15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 2000) (noting that trial court granted summary judgment based on
non-moving party's failure to "respond to the Motion within 10 days as required by rule
4-501(l)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration") Thus, the trial court's
adherence to the mandatory language of Rule 4-501 was proper and in harmony with Utah
precedent. Green's facts are admitted for purposes of summary judgment.
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The foregoing demonstrates that it was proper to adhere to the mandatory
language of Rule 4-501 that "[a] 11 material facts . . . shall be deemed admitted."
(Emphasis added.) According to Green's undisputed facts, Green did everything Layton
City requires of developers. He ordered a soil report, made it public record, and complied
with all other rules and regulations regarding developer duties. (R. 508-10.) The City did
not require any further disclosures or acknowledge any soil defects calling for special
caution. It approved the land and "allowed the house to go forward." (R. 1705 at 54-55.)
Because the trial court properly relied on Rule 4-501 to hold that Green was
not liable under any legal theory, his Motion for Summary Judgment was properly
granted.
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT FENNELL'S NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW,
The trial court correctly concluded that Fennell's negligent failure to disclose
claim should be dismissed as a matter of law. Assuming that "negligent failure to
disclose" is a viable cause of action in Utah, the elements of such a claim might be similar
to a negligence claim. However, there are three independent bases, in addition to the
Rule 4-501 basis, for why the negligent failure to disclose claim should be dismissed as a
matter of law.
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A. Fennell's Negligent Failure to Disclose Claim Fails as a
Matter of Law Because of the Economic Loss Doctrine.
Fennell's negligent failure to disclose claim fails because of the Economic
Loss Doctrine. Fennell has conceded, and in fact affirmatively asserts, that the losses he
has suffered are economic in nature. In Fennell's memorandum in opposition to GMW's
(Ivory) motion for summary judgment, Fennell declares in capital letters: "PLAINTIFF
MAY RECOVER FOR ECONOMIC LOSS." (R. 401.)
The economic loss rule provides that one "may not recover economic losses
under a theory of non-intentional tort" absent physical damage to "other property" or
bodily injury. American Towers Owners v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189
(Utah 1996) (quoting, Maak v. Resource Design & Constr.. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994)). In American Towers, the court defined economic loss as follows:
[d]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement
product, or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal
injury or damage to other property . . . as well as the diminution in
the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does
not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured
and sold.
Idatll89.2
In American Towers, a condominium association brought suit against the
defendants who designed, developed and constructed the condominium complex. The

2

As the court in American Towers declared, "otherwise, the extension of tort
law would result in liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class." See American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190-91.
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allegations in the complaint generally concerned problems with the complex's plumbing
and mechanical system. In part, the association alleged that the defendants negligently
failed to design, construct, supervise and inspect the construction of the property. As a
result, the association alleged that it incurred substantial and ongoing reparation costs,
substantial diminution of the value of the property, and other special and consequential
damages.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
basis that the claim failed as a matter of law because "the alleged damages are for
economic loss, not for injury to persons or other property." Id. at 1188 (emphasis added).
On appeal the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, the Court explained the above
principles of law and held:
The Association contends that the complex's plumbing and
mechanical systems do not meet their expectations, resulting in a
diminution in value of their purchase measured by the cost of repair.
This deterioration of the complex does not qualify for the "damage to
other property" exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine.
Id. at 1191 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court defined the damaged property
as the "entire complex itself and that there was no damage to any ''other property". Id. at
1191. The court found the damaged property was a package, including the "land, design
services, and construction of a dwelling." Id.
Like American Towers, the plaintiff in this case, Fennell, is seeking recovery
for loss of value to the residential property itself, but not to "other property." Lot 31 is
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not "other property." It is "the property." In other words, Fennell believes the Lot he
purchased has not lived up to his expectations and has been diminished in value as a
result of the landslide. (R. 2-11.) Fennell indeed refers to this as an "inherent defect" of
the Lot. (R. 5.) The failure of the Lot itself cannot constitute damage to "other property."
Because the loss of value to his home and a diminution in the quality of the real estate is
an economic loss, see id at 1189, and because there has been no damage to other
property, the Economic Loss Doctrine precludes FennelPs negligence cause of action.
The foregoing demonstrates that the Economic Loss Doctrine serves as a
separate, proper basis for summary judgment as to FennelPs negligent failure to disclose
claim.
B. FennelPs Negligent Failure to Disclose Claim Fails Because
Fennell Did Not Present Any Facts or Evidence to Indicate
That Green Knew of Landslide Potential on Lot 31.
FennelPs negligent failure to disclose claim fails for yet another, independent
reason, which is that Fennell did not present any facts or evidence to indicate that Green
knew of landslide potential on Lot 31. Fennell sues Green "by reason of a landslide" and
by reason of a supposed failure to disclose that risk. (FennelPs Appellate Brief, p. 5.)
Fennell apparently argues that Green should have known that Lot 31 was
subject to landslides and was not buildable. However, after thoroughly reviewing the
record, the trial court recognized that the soil engineer's opinion was that Lot 31 was not
subject to landslides and was buildable and that there was nothing in the record to
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controvert that fact. Maughan, the soils engineer, testified m his deposition as follows:
Q My question is: Was the area on the flat surface of 21 [31] stable
as opposed to the bank itself where the stream had undercut it?
A Yes.
Q And you felt there was not a slide in that area, that the stream had
simply undercut it?
A That's right. . . .
(R. 818-19.)
Q So when you finished up your analysis of this subdivision, you
did not believe this area was a slide area in any of the lots, and that
the only area where there had been some movement was on Lot 21,
and that's because the stream had undercut the bank dov/n below?
A That's right.
Q Is that a fair statement?
A Yes.
(R. 818-19.)
Q And from that observation and opinion that you've made, you
determined that this was not a slide area but just an undercut by the
creek, correct.
A Yes.
(R. 818-19.)
Q . . . had you had any data or information that would have told you
that that north slope was a landslide area as opposed to just being
undercut by the creek along part of Lot [31], you would have had
different opinions than what you put in [your reports]?
A Well, I looked at the slide itself and it was - the failure was very
very steep, which in it - so it wasn't a sloughing like most slides
that have stairsteps going back.
Q And I understand that, sir. So my question is: If you'd had
some data or an opinion that this was a landslide area, you
certainly would have put that in your report and told somebody
about it; is that true?
A That's true.
(R. 818-1.) (emphasis added).
MR. BELNAP: Line nine. Question: "And is that a sufficient strength to
handle residential housing? He' talking about the testing he did.
11. "Yesitfs;
Q... "And did that apply to that north slope as well as other property in that
subdivision?
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A... "It was just the flats up on top buildable.
Q... "The buildable area of the property?
"Yeah, because he said he wasn't going to build on the slopes."
This house is not built on the slope, your Honor.
(R. 1705 at pp. 58-59.)
If Maughan, the expert, did not believe the lot was subject to landslides, and
believed it was buildable, it was undisputed that Green could not have known any
differently. Further, as stated earlier, Green did everything Layton City requires of
developers. He ordered a soil report, which was published with Layton City, and
complied with all other rules and regulations for developers. (R. 508-10.) The City did
not require any further disclosures or acknowledge any soil defects calling for special
disclosure, and approved the house to go forward; Green therefore had no knowledge of
Lot 31 being unsuitable.
The foregoing demonstrates that the lack of any facts or evidence showing that
Green knew of a landslide condition serves as a separate, proper basis for summary
judgment on the negligent failure to disclose claim.
C. FennelPs Claim of Negligent Failure to Disclose Fails for the
Independent Reason That Green Was under No Duty to
Communicate to Fennell, and Green's Vendee Ivory North
Knew about the Soil Conditions.
Fennell's claim of negligent failure to disclose fails because Green, who never
even spoke to Fennell, was under no duty to communicate to Fennell. The Utah Supreme
Court in First Security Bank v. Banberrv Dev., 786 P.2d 1326, 1328-29 (Utah 1990)
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discussed five potential situations where failure to disclose might be actionable: 1) parties
negotiating a contract, 2) fiduciary relationship, 3) dominance-inferiority relationship
such as attorney-client, doctor-patient, or priest-penitent, 4) statutory obligation, and 5)
the breach of those duties to an individual causing personal injury to a third party. See
First Security. 786 P.2d at 1330.
By examining the categories, it is clear categories one, two, and three do not
apply in the present case. Each of these presupposes some sort of dealings or relationship
one with another, of which Green and Fennell had absolutely none (R. 510). Category
four is not an issue in this case because Fennell has not made a showing that Green had
any statutory duty to Fennell. Therefore, Fennelfs argument that Green had a duty to
place something in the restrictive covenants, deed, or plaf for Fennell's information is
without a legal basis.
Indeed, Green's only duty of disclosure would be to his immediate purchaser,
Ivory North. This is where category five from Banbery becomes relevant (failure to
disclose resulting in personal injury to third persons to whom the duty of disclosure is not
owed). First, the language from the Banberry case suggests that this category only applies
in cases of personal injury: "involves cases where & person is injuredby another's breach
. .." IcL at 1330 (emphasis added). There is no indication that category five refers to
economic harm resulting from the failure of real estate to meet economic expectations.
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Moreover, even if category five did refer to cases of economic injury, category
five would still not apply. It is undisputed that Green complied with his duties of
disclosure to Ivory North when the soils report was made a matter of public record.
(R. 509, 526.) Further, although Green disputes that he knew of any soil defects (because
his investigations with the soil expert and the City turned up no such defects) Fennell's
own allegations and judicial admissions are that Ivory North had full disclosure of the
alleged soil defects: "Defendant Ivory North had knowledge regarding the geological
condition and problems with Lot 31 [from Neil Wall]." (R. 395.); "Wall and Green both
state that a conversation was had with [Ivory North] . . . advising [Ivory North] to place
the house as far south on the lot in order to avoid the issue as to the instability of the soils
as far as the residence was concerned1' (FennelFs Appellate Brief, p. 11). Fennell also
alleges Ivory North paid a discount price for the lot because of the potential problems
thereon. (R. 599.)
Thus, Fennell has judicially admitted that Ivory North, Green's purchaser, had
disclosure of and notice of the alleged soil conditions of which Fennell now complains.
There simply is no duty of a developer to disclose land defects known to its purchaser:
We do not interpret this duty to extend to deficiencies in residential
building lots that are easily discernible during an ordinary and
reasonable investigation by a purchaser and that are in fact known
of by the purchaser.
Loveland v. Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). Fennell
cannot have it both ways by claiming that Ivory North did not know so as to keep Green
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in the case, and at the same time alleging that Ivory North (lid know so as to keep Ivory
North in the case.
The foregoing demonstrates that Fennell's negligent failure to disclose claim is
barred as a matter of law because Green had no duty to communicate to Fennell, and
Fennell asserts that Ivory North had knowledge of the adverse soil conditions.
D. FennelPs Reliance on Loveland V. Orem City Corp. Is
Misplaced.
Fennell relies on Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987). In
Loveland, homeowners brought a claim against a developer and others when their child
drowned in a canal located near their home. The homeowners argued, and the court
agreed, that the developer owed a duty to insure that the property being subdivided is
suitable for residential housing. IcL at 769. Citing the Wyoming case of Anderson v.
Bauer. 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984), the Court went on to explore whether the
"nonbuilding subdivider owes [that] duty to sub vendees." The Court never answered the
subvendee question but concluded that at a minimum, a nonbuilding subdivider owes its
immediate purchaser a duty of disclosure.
However, the legal duty of the developer identified in Loveland must be
considered in connection with the facts of the case. First, the facts of Loveland involved
strictly bodily harm. While the Loveland Court relied on Anderson and Stepanov v.
Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979) which did not involve bodily harm, the Loveland
court prefaced its discussion of Anderson by stating that "[ajlthough there has been no
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wholesale importation of the principles underlying products liability into the real estate
context, some exceptions have arisen where the prior landowner was a professional
developer." Id. at 769. By comparing the developer duty with products liability, and
because products liability does not recognize strictly economic harm, it can be inferred
that the Court was limiting its analysis to cases of bodily injury or property damage. It
can further be inferred that any analysis in Loveland beyond bodily injury is dictum, since
the facts of that case were limited to bodily injury.
But even if this Court is persuaded by such dictum, the fact remains that if the
immediate purchaser actually knows of the deficiencies, the developer may freely sell the
property "inasmuch as purchasers are often willing to accept known deficiencies in land
in exchange for a lower purchase price." Id. at 769. As briefed above, Eennell alleges in
certain terms that Green's purchaser, Ivory North, had disclosure of the precarious soil
conditions and even bargained for a lower price. Therefore, just as the developer in
Loveland was entitled to summary judgment because its purchaser/builder knew of the
land defects, so too should Green be entitled to summary judgment based on Fennell's
judical assertions and judicial admissions that Green's purchaser, Ivory North, knew of
the defects. Loveland supports Green's position, not Fennell's, and Fennell's reliance
thereon is misplaced.
In summary, because Fennell did not comply with Rule 4-501, because Green
did not have a legal duty to communicate to Fennell, because Green did not know of the
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potential for landslides, because the Layton City Engineer approved the lot for
development and Green followed all required regulations for development, because
Fennell alleges that Green's vendee Ivory North knew of whatever problems existed on
the lot, because the soils report was a matter of public record, and because Fennell's
negligent failure to disclose claim is barred by the Economic Loss Doctrine, the trial court
correctly decided that Fennell's negligent failure to disclose claim fails as a matter of law.
These reasons are in addition to Fennell's failure to comply with Rule 4-501.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT FENNELL'S INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE CLAIM (AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES) SHOULD
BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
As stated previously in this brief, Fennell's failure to follow Rule 4-501
entitles Green to judgment as a matter of law on all claims, including the intentional
failure to disclose claim.
Further, there is no such cause of action in Utah for "intentional failure to
disclose," as alleged by Fennell. (R. 2-11.) Even if the "intentional failure to disclose"
claim were intended to be a fraud claim, Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires Fennell to allege fraud with particularity, which he has not done. There is no
averment that Green had the intent to induce reliance by deception or any like allegations
that would spell out a cause of action for fraud.
Utah does recognize a cause of action for "fraudulent non-disclosure." Even if
such a cause of action had been pled (which it has not), an action for fraudulent non20

disclosure requires a showing that the defect or condition be known to the nondisclosing
party, that the defect or condition be material, and that the nondisclosing party have a
legal duty to communicate. See e ^ Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d
570, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). As stated above in the argument regarding negligent
failure to disclose, Fennell has failed to establish that the defect or condition was known
to Green, that Green had a legal duty to communicate to Fennell, or that Green failed to
communicate anything he should have to Ivory North. The clear and convincing
evidentiary standard must be considered with respect to fraud claims at the summary
judgment stage. See Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
("clear and convincing standard must be considered in determining whether motion for
summary judgment should be granted on fraud claim") (citation omitted). That standard
was not met, as the trial court found that there was no evidence presented by Fennell that
Green had done anything improper.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that Fennell's
intentional failure to disclose claim and request for punitive damages should be dismissed
as a matter of law.
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
FENNELL'S IMPLIED WARRANTY CLAIM SHOULD BE
DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
It appears that Fennell abandoned his implied warranty claim during oral
argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment:
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MR. WELLS: For the third time, we're not dealing with
habitability of the residence. We're dealing with the condition of
the land.
THE COURT: So is that an implied warranty or not?
MR. WELLS: It's not an implied warranty in terms of dealing with
habitability.
THE COURT: Okay, so is that under a negligent failure to disclose
or an intentional failure to disclose or an implied warranty theory?
MR. WELLS: It's not an implied warranty, it's failure to disclose.
(R. 1705 at pp. 76-77) (emphasis added.) Thus, presumably due to the briefing on the law
that was developed subsequent to Fennell filing his complaint, it appears that Fennell has
abandoned his implied warranty claim.
Even if Fennell had not waived or abandoned the implied warranty claim, that
claim must fail as a matter of law. Fennell's property is residential property. Utah does
not recognize an implied warranty on residential property. See American Towers Owners v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). Therefore, the trial court properly
dismissed this claim as a matter of law.
Furthermore, this Court has held that even if an implied warranty claim is not
labeled "habitability," it will be treated as such if it walks and talks like the implied
warranty of habitability. See Snow Flower Homeowners' Assoc, v. Snow Flower Ltd.,
2001 UT App, % 30, 31 P.3d 576. In the present case, Plaintiff purchased a finished home
to live in, and now sues because he believes the underlying real estate makes the home
unsuitable for living. (R. 2-11.) According to his Complaint, he bought the property so
that he could live on it. (R. 2-11.) For all practical purposes, the warranty claim is a
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claim based on the implied warranty of habitability. Construction may have been Ivory's
North's purpose, but Plaintiffs purpose was to live on the property. It does not matter
what Plaintiff calls it, his implied warranty claim is indistinguishable from a claim
asserting breach of implied warranty of habitability.
VI. RESPONSE TO FENNELL'S COMMENTS AGAINST
THE TRIAL COURT.
Fennell argues in his Appellate Brief, that the trial judge was biased, and that
he only granted summary judgment so that he could receive guidance from the Court of
Appeals regarding the law. This is not a full or accurate representation of the trial court's
decision for granting summary judgment.
The court stated at the opening of oral argument:
I have about a month or two ago when we started scheduling this
stuff, I had looked through the pleadings that had been filed at that
time and read them, and then this week I have read them and last
night I have read them, and after I have read and read and read
these things, how many trees were destroyed in this process.
(R. 1705 at p. 1.) The trial court stated as follows at the conclusion of oral arguments:
I have no - I'm giving you what is my best opinion on everything
that I have read, and I have read all of your papers and I have read
them more than once. So this is the best I can do and that's going
to be my ruling. And a lot of people often times say, Well, gee, you
know, here's this judge, he rules right from the bench. Well, I hope
you understand that all last night I took these things home and read
them for about four or five hours in addition to what I had done
before. It is my position that I should be prepared when you have
oral arguments so that the parties can have a ruling today rather
than let this go and take it under advisement for a month, two
months, three months, forget exactly what I heard at the motion and
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what I've read and then rule. So I have done my homework before
making this ruling. I don't do it arbitrarily.
(R. 1705, at 93-94.) This does not indicate a bias or that the trial court shirked its judicial
responsibilities. It demonstrates diligence. Furthermore, the detail with which the court
conducted the hearing and made his ruling demonstrates a thorough, unbiased
consideration of the issues and reflects that he made his legal determinations to the best of
his ability.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant/Appellee Green requests that this
Court affirm the trial court's summary judgment as to all of Fennell's claims, dismissing
them with prejudice.
DATED this / /

day of September, 2002.
i

Paul M. Belnap
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Edward Green
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OPERATION OF THE COURTS

Rule 4-501

[Rule 4-408, Locations of t r i a l c o u r t s of record*
llntent:
f« To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
^/This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
-Statement of t h e Riile:
- (1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated
Sas locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City;
, Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish
?Fork; West Valley City
'; (2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of record may hold
^eourt in any location designated by this rule.
^(Added effective January 1, 1992; amended effective November 15, 1995.)
r

Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of trial
courts.

^Intent:
? To designate the court locations administered directly through the administrative office of the courts and those administered through contract with local
- government pursuant to § 78-3-21.
Applicability:
, This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administrative
; office of the courts.
.Statement of t h e Rule:
t < (1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly through
;,the administrative office of the courts.
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly through
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall be
^administered through contract with county or municipal government pursuant
to § 78-3-21: Coalville, Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan, Panguitch, Park City, Randolph, and Salem
,(Added effective November 15, 1995; amended effective January 27, 1997;
^November 1, 1998.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend' ment, m Subdivision (2), substituted "district
court" for "district and circuit courts" and de-

leted "Castle Dale" from the listed exceptions
The 1998 amendment deleted "Beaver" before "Coalville" m Subdivision (2)

ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE
"Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a-procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rude
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief.
Statement of t h e Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda,
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of nmntQ fln^
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authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte
application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages the application shall include a
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion/ a
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation.
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the
clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph
(1)(D) of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period
to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, w&s served, the date
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties.
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions cf the record upon which the
movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated m separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth
in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
; unless specifically controverted by the opposmg party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs
(3)(B) or (4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion
may file a written request for a hearing.
f
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion
or opposition to the motion is fiivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively
decided.
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(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be
heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and
notify all parties of the date and time.
. (E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or
opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least
two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date
without leave of the court.
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion
without oral argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
r where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996;
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment substituted "trial courts of record" for
"district courts" in the applicability paragraph,
added Subdivision (3)(h), and made a stylistic
change.

The 1999 amendment substituted "claim" for
"issues" in Subdivision (3)(B).
The 2001 amendment added the second sentence to Subdivision (1)(D) and made stylistic
changes in the subdivision designations.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Decisions sua sponte.
Purpose.
Request for hearing.
Supplemental memoranda.
When rule applies.
Cited.
Decisions sua sponte.
While a court may refrain from addressing a
matter that is not submitted for decision under
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua
sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980
R2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah
1999).
No notice to submit for decision under this
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly
determined that it could rule on pending motions sua sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App
139, 980 R2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271
(Utah 1999).
Purpose.

tration is not to create or modify substantive
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the
manner in which the courts operate. Scott v.
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P.2d 214, cert,
denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
Request for hearing.
Once a request for hearing by one of the
parties has been granted and the matter set for
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon
such setting regardless of whether it made its
own request. Price v. Armour, 949 PJ2d 1251
(Utah 1997).
Supplemental memoranda.
The plural "memoranda" in Subdivision (lXa)
refers to all memoranda received by the court
— from all parties that either oppose or support
any motion — and does not mean that each
party may submit more than one memorandum; thus, the trial court was well within its
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental
memorandum that was submitted withrmf
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Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and
documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda.
All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by
a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or
citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing
a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the
court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an
over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the principal
memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion.

The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days
after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all
supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving
party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as
provided in paragraph (1)(D) of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum.
The moving party may serve and file-a reply memorandum within five days after
service of the responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision.
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either
party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision. The
notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The Notice to Submit for Decision shall state
the date on which the motion was served, the date the memorandum in opposition,
if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and
whether a hearing has been requested. The notification shall contain a
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the
motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion.
The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to
which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion.
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the
movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue
exists followed by a concise statement of material facts which support the
party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered
b y the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3) (B) or
(4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or
any claim in the action, on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion
m a y file a written request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or
set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided.

(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be heard
and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and notify all
parties of the date and time.
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing
the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two
working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall -be clearly marked as
courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. Courtesy copies
shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before
the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date
without leave of the court.
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or the court
on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion without oral
argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions.
Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a
request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence
and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where
the motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved
summarily.
(5) Telephone conference.
The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct arguments of
any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim record
shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by
counsel.
HISTORY: Amended effective January 15, 1990/ April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996;
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2001
NOTES:
Amendment Notes.-- The 1998 amendment substituted "trial courts of record"
for "district courts" in the applicability paragraph, added Subdivision (3)(h),
and made a stylistic change.
The 1999 amendment substituted "cl aim" for "issues" in Subdivision (3)(B).
The April 2001 amendment added the second sentence to Subdivision (1)(D) and
made stylistic changes in the subdivision designations.
The November 2001 amendment, in Subdivision (2)(B), at the end of the first
sentence substituted the language beginning "contains a verbatim restatement"
for "a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a
genuine issue exists" and deleted "and, if applicable, shall state the numbered
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed" at the end of the
second sentence.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, U,

]

])
)
vs.
])
)
EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, aka
;
NEIL J. WALL and GMW DEVELOPMENT, ;)
INC., dba IVORY NORTH.
]
)
Defendant.
]
Plaintiff.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSAL OF EDWARD D.
GREEN AND NEIL WALL, aka
NEIL J. WALL
Civil No. 000601295 PD
Judge Thomas L. Kay

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 25w day of October, 2001 at the
hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge on motions for
summary" judgment, including motions for summary judgment filed by Edward D. Green and
Neil Wall, aka Neil J. Wall (hereinafter "Green and Wall").
The plaintiff was represented by his counsel of record and the defendants were
represented by their counsel of record.
The Court reviewed the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the motions

and has reviewed the case law cited by the parties and ha\ ing considered the same and the oral
argument of counsel presented in favor of and in opposition to the motions, determined that the
motions for summary judgment of Green and Wall should be and are hereby granted, dismissing
the complaint of the plaintiff against them. The Court desires to set forth its reasoning for the
granting of the motions for summary judgment of Green and Wall and provided explanation for
the same at the time of ruling on the motions at the hearing and confirms the same as the basis
for its ruling together with this statement of the reasons in this written Order.
1 The time of the motions for summary judgment was appropriate as the parties had
completed their discovery in this case giving the attorneys the opportunity to know the issues and
facts.
2. The Court believes that under the terms of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, together with Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, that summary
judgment is warranted as the court determines from the pleadings filed and the matters presented
that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and that Green and Wall are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
3 Rule 4-501 (2)(B) is a rule that this Court has relied upon and does so in this case
as a separate basis for the granting of the motions for summary judgment dismissing Green and
Wall. In the materials filed by Green and Wall in support of their motions, said parties listed the
facts by paragraphs which they contended were not in dispute. The rule required the plaintiff to
set forth specifically:
[A] concise statement of material facts as to which the party
contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be

stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically
refer to those portions of the record upon which the
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that
are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference
to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement.
The Court determines that the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) and
therefore the facts set forth in the memoranda filed by Green and Wall in support of their motions
are deemed admitted and make summary judgment proper under the facts and circumstances of
the legal arguments made.
4. As a separate basis for the granting of the motions of Green and Wall, the Court
has reviewed Exhibit 4 to the deposition of Neil J. Wall together with the deposition referred to
and referenced by the parties of Glenn Roy Maughan. The Court determines that there are no
genuine issues as to any material facts regarding the fact thai at die ume Maughan performed his
soils studies on the lots in the proposed subdivision, including Lot 21, which became Lot 31 on
the subsequent plan (see deposition Exhibits 1 and 5 of the Deposition of Xeil J. Wall), Maughan
was of the opinion that the area of the hill on the north side of Lot 31 was not a landslide.
Accordingly, Green and Wall did not have knowledge of an alleged landslide condition as
plaintiff now alleges, at the time that the subdivision was platted and the subject lot was sold to
defendants GMW and Ivory North. Therefore, Green and Wall did not fail to disclose the alleged
landslide condition now complained of by the plaintiff This court determines from the facts
3

deemed admitted together with the facts set forth in Exhibit 4 of the Neil J. Wall deposition and
the deposition of Glenn Roy Maughan, do not indicate there was a landslide condition that would
have been known to Green and Wall at the times in question, as alleged by the plaintiffs.
5. As a matter of law, plaintiff has also failed to state a claim in his pleadings for
fraudulent non-disclosure and further, even if such a cause of action had been pled, there has
been a failure to establish that the alleged non-disclosed information was known to Green and
Wall. Further, plaintiff has failed to establish a legal duty on the part Green and Wall to
communicate with the plaintiff.
6. It is undisputed that Green and Wall did not sell the subject lot to the plaintiff, and
plaintiff has failed to establish facts from which this court would find a legal duty to the plaintiff.
7. In the case before this court, the only issues of damage involved are those of
economic loss for which no recovery is available under the theories pled by the plaintiff in this
action, whether in negligence or alleged warranty proposed by plaintiff.
8. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a basis to determine that there were any
concealed conditions known to Green and Wall at the time of the sale to GMW/Ivory and further.
the plaintiff was outside the land at the time of the damages alleged. Therefore, the exceptions to
the doctrine of caveat emptor, urged by plaintiff do not exist in this case. Accordingly, the Court
determines that the cases cited and relied upon by the parties support the granting of summary
judgment to Green and Wall.
9. The Court has spent considerable time reviewing the memoranda of the parties
4

and the case law and in ruling on the motions at the subject hearing did so, having first fully
reviewed all matters submitted and having considered the oral argument of counsel and the legal
precedent and rules stated herein. Therefore, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions for
Summary Judgment of Green and Wall are granted and the claims of the plaintiff against Green
and Wall are hereby dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendants.
DATED this

T ^ a v of ^ ^ ^ 2 0 0 1 .
BY THE COURT:

$%M >Vj
Thomas L. Kay
Second District CWrt Judge
Approved as to Form:

l^n^JL/HJlJl^jL
fJLzSfzx E. Stark
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

9

day of November, 2001 a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Edward D. Green and Neil Wall, aka
Neil J. Wall was served by the method indicated below, to the following:
LaVar E. Stark
2485 Grant Avenue
Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Frank M. Wells
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Elizabeth Hruby-Mills
Brandon B Hobbs
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144
Attorneys for Defendant Neil Wall
David R. Hamilton
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Additional Attorneys for Defendant
Neil Wall
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iSf
( )
( )
( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

( )
( )
( )

U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

{Y^
( )
( )
( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

o
o
o

U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Barbara Berrett
WEISS, BERRETT & PETTY
Attorneys for GMW Development, Inc.
dba Ivory North
Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street, Suite 530
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

iyf
( )
( )
( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

fi^UltJL /J^t^f^^J^
4770.401
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Tab 4

that was specifically excluded as well in the Snowflower case*
And so again, that's been kind of a moving target, but it's
clear that Utah law does not recognize it.
THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

Mr. Wells.
MR. WELLS:

Just one additive, and that was the

Mitchell vs. Christensen case which was subsequently submitted
to the court which again addresses the duty of disclosure as to
vendor/vendee and makes reference to the Banbury case as well,
and the issue - the duties are non-disclosed information is
material, that the non-disclosed information is known to the
party failing to disclose, and there's a legal duty to
communicate.

And we assert that that's the instance here, and

essentially that underlines Elder vs. Clawson which we had
recited in our brief and again we're dealing with the failure
to disclose, and talks about whether the defect would be
apparent to ordinary prudent persons with like experience, not
to persons with specialized knowledge in the field of
construction or real estate.

Mr. Fennell would be an ordinary

person, obviously Ivory North would not be, and in any event we
feel that we're not dealing with a contractual warranty, but
we're dealing with an undisclosed defect.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything further from anyone on

[inaudible]?
Okay, I appreciate all of the pleadings that have
90

1

been filed that were able to be reviewed and the manner

2

which we did this hearing.

3

more helpful to kind of discuss the facts and the background

4

before we went directly to the motions so that I could

5

understand this case better.

6

m

I think it was helpful for me, much

I am a strong believer in Rule 56 of the Rules of

7

Civil Procedure.

By saying that, I don't mean that every

8

motion for summary judgment should be granted.

9

that every - I think that once discovery has been completed and

But I think

10

the people know, the people who are the attorneys m

the case

11

and the parties know what the issues are, know what the facts

12

are that it's both appropriate to file a motion for summary

13

judgment if a party believes it is well based, as it is to

14

oppose one.

15

And I think the federal cases have gone, you know, maybe

16

differently from our own state cases with the Celotex line of

17

cases.

18

you know, the issue is are there disputed facts.

19

believe that Rule 4-501 was created for a reason, and I see it

20

a lot better now as a judge than as an attorney, and the reason

21

as a judge is that it's much easier to place two or three memos

22

side by side and go one through 20 and one through. 20, see

23

citations to the record and see if there is a dispute.

24

not trying to point the finger of blame at anyone, but when I

25

do not have what's required by Rule 4-501, I'm at a

However, I think Rule 56 was there for a reason.

However, our Supreme Court has stated that where there,
I also

And I'm
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disadvantage.

And I do not believe that the. sheer size of a

file when you lift it and heft it means, gee, there must be an
issue of dispute - disputed fact in there somewhere-

I think

it's up to the parties to bring up those issues and make it
clear to the judge.
In this case, I think that I believe when Rule 4-501
says they shall be deemed admitted, they are deemed admitted.
And on the basis of that alone, these three motions for summary
judgment should be granted because there was no response as per
that rule.
Going beyond Rule 4-051, I think we found here today
that the issue really becomes everything that Mr. Maun told
anyone, and I'm looking at Exhibit 4 to the Wall deposition
that talks about what we described before as a landfall.
There's been numerous references to Mr. Maun's deposition in
this case. And his deposition, when the issue about landslide
came up and whether this was a landslide, he answered that
question negatively.

And so even if 4-501 doesn't apply

because everything is deemed admitted, I find that there is not
a disputed issue of fact.
In addition to that, I find that the case law cited
by the defendants in this case as it relates to the economic
loss rule as to their interpretation of the Loveland case,
their interpretation of the implied warranties, and just this
whole issue of what was known that I don't find a disputed fact
92

1

that something was known to these defendants that should have

2

been given under these cases to the plaintiff in this case.

3

Now, the other reason as I mentioned in my questions was I

4

think it's important for these things to be resolved.

If I am

5

wrong, I'll be the first one to admit that I'm wrong.

But I -

6

I think as a trial judge need direction from the, either the

7

Utah Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals for this type of

8

case under the facts that you have presented to me.

9

think it is much better of for all parties, whether it's the

.0

plaintiff or the defendants, to have this issue and that these

.1

motions granted at this time which gives you the opportunity to

.2

say - and I'm not going to be heard if it goes up to the

13

Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals and they say I shouldn't

14

have granted this motion and they give me some direction,

L5

because I believe that will help all of us for a trial if

16

that's what happens.

17

And I

Having ruled on the summary judgment motions, I

L8

really think the other motions are moot as it relates to the

L9

motion to compel, motion to amend or motion for protective

20

order.

21

strongly suggest that, you know, people appeal this ruling so

12

that you can get this issue clarified.

23

you what is my best opinion on everything that I have read, and

24

I have read all of your papers and I have read them more than

25

once.

And so I'm going to rule that way.

And I would

I have no - I'm giving

So this is the best that I can do and that's going to be
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my ruling.

And a lot of people often times rsay, Well/ gee, you

know, here's this judge, he rules right from the bench. Well,
I hope you understand that all last night I took these things
home and read them for about four or five hours in addition to
what I had done before.

It is my position that I should be

prepared when you have oral arguments so that the -parties can
have a ruling today rather than let this go and take it under
advisement for a month, two months, three months, forget
exactly what I heard at the motion and what I've read and then
rule.

So I have done my homework before making this ruling.

don't do it arbitrarily.

I

I basically have - I'm as prepared

now as I will be prepared at any time to make rulings in this
case.
Having made those rulings, is it the position of the
parties to have one order that would subsume that so that that
can be the order, or do you want separate orders for each one
of them?
MR. BELNAP:

I would ask, your Honor, to be able to

prepare an order in conjunction with Ms. Ruby-Mills relative to
Green and Wall because the Ivory might be a little different.
THE COURT:
MR. BELNAP:
THE COURT:

Okay.
On our motions.
You see that differently, Mr. North, that

you prepare one on your motion and they prepare one jointly?
MR. NORTH:

That's fine.
94

THE COURT:

L

Okay, is that in agreement - is that all

2

right with the plaintiffs?

In other words, there be two orders

3

based upon what we've done today.

4

MR. STARK:

No objection, your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

Okay, well, I appreciate everyone's

6

response.

Somebody left me this one deposition.

7

other papers need to be - do you need them?

Do these

8

MR. STARK:

Your Honor -

9

THE COURT:

I think they were torn out of it -

.0

MR. STARK:

- they can stay as part of the record if

.1

you'd like.
THE COURT:

L2

Okay.

Well, I think what's - I will keep

13

these.

Everything that was referred to in the Maun deposition

L4

was read, and it's also been attached to some memos.

L5

Okay, thank you very much.

16

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(c)
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